# Insurtech Valuations: Q3 2026

Insurtech does not trade at a multiple, because insurtech is not one business. It is two, priced in different currencies. Windsor Drake screened 26 listed companies on 21 August 2026 and carries 23. The fourteen that sell into insurance without putting their own balance sheet behind a policy clear a median **4.9x EV/Revenue**, range 0.1x to 11.1x. The nine that carry underwriting risk clear a median **2.64x price to book value**, range 1.89x to 8.27x.

The mechanism is a reporting convention with real consequences. A carrier books net earned premium as revenue, a gross risk-transfer flow rather than a service margin, and the portfolio behind that premium is reserve collateral rather than corporate cash. Root Inc demonstrates it: an $864.4 million market capitalisation against $1,026.7 million of cash and investments and $197.8 million of debt gives a conventional enterprise value of $35.5 million, or 0.02x trailing revenue. That prices the reserve portfolio, so this report uses book value and combined ratio.

The evidence is the dispersion it explains. Core insurance software clears a 9.1x median across Guidewire, Verisk and CCC Intelligent Solutions. Listed retail brokers clear 4.9x and agency platforms 5.1x. Lead marketplaces, also called distribution, clear 0.6x. Guidewire at 11.1x and eHealth at 0.14x are seventeen times apart on the same day and the same metric.

Windsor Drake calls this **The Risk Line**: the point in the value chain at which the denominator changes, and a structural choice made years before a process begins. This report sets out where each constituent sits on it, what the carrier cohort is paid for, what acquirers paid, and how the backdrop stands. Six of the 55 distinct insurtech transactions in the Windsor Drake Exit Index disclose consideration, so the comparable set a seller builds is usually the only benchmark available.

## What are insurtech companies worth in 2026?

The table below is computed rather than licensed, and every constituent is named.

**Table 1. Insurtech Valuation Multiples Above the Risk Line, Q3 2026**

| Segment | Constituents | Median EV/ Revenue | Observed range |
|---|---|---|---|
| Core insurance software | Guidewire, Verisk, CCC | 9.1x | 5.0x to 11.1x |
| Agency platform and franchise | Goosehead, TWFG, Baldwin | 5.1x | 3.9x to 7.3x |
| Retail broker, listed | Gallagher, Aon, Brown & Brown, Marsh | 4.9x | 4.0x to 5.3x |
| Lead marketplace | EverQuote, MediaAlpha, SelectQuote, eHealth | 0.6x | 0.1x to 0.9x |
| Cohort | All fourteen constituents | 4.9x | 0.1x to 11.1x |

*Source: Windsor Drake computation, 21 August 2026. Cohort interquartile range 1.7x to 5.3x.*

Read the spread, not only the level: the 4.9x median sits between segments with almost nothing in common. PB Fintech, the listed Indian insurance marketplace, clears 11.9x on the same basis in rupees, which is where a marketplace sits before acquisition cost overtakes renewal economics.

## Why are insurtech carriers not valued on revenue?

Because the revenue line means something different. For Guidewire it is licence, subscription and services income. For Slide Insurance it is premium earned net of a large cession, against $2.08 billion of cash and investments backing Florida catastrophe reserves. Netting that portfolio against market capitalisation measures reserving.

Windsor Drake's fintech comparable set applies a test for this: a constituent whose equity trades at or below its net cash leaves the revenue median. Applied to insurtech, that test does not remove one company. It moves the whole carrier cohort onto the measures the industry uses.

**Table 2. The Risk-Bearing Carrier Cohort, Q3 2026**

| Carrier | Price to book | Q2 2026 underwriting result | Q2 2026 premium growth |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lemonade | 8.27x | 60% gross loss ratio, no combined ratio | +32.4% in-force premium |
| Kinsale Capital | 4.29x | 75.5% combined ratio | -5.0% gross premium |
| Palomar Holdings | 3.49x | 83.3% combined ratio | +27.0% gross premium |
| Trupanion | 3.32x | 70.2% vet invoice expense ratio | +5% subscription pets |
| Root | 2.64x | 92.1% net combined ratio | -2% gross premium |
| Kingstone Companies | 2.22x | 70.2% GAAP combined ratio | +18.7% direct premiums |
| Slide Insurance | 2.20x | 57.6% net combined ratio | +16.7% gross premium |
| HCI Group | 2.10x | 22.2% gross loss and LAE ratio | +7.2% gross premium |
| Hippo Holdings | 1.89x | 95.8% net combined ratio | +61.5% gross premium |

*Source: Company Q2 2026 earnings releases and SEC filings; Windsor Drake computation from market capitalisation on 21 August 2026 and shareholders' equity at 30 June 2026. Median 2.64x, interquartile range 2.20x to 3.49x.*

## Why do insurance brokers trade nine times higher than insurance marketplaces?

Because a broker owns a renewal and a marketplace owns a transaction. Goosehead clears 7.3x on a franchise book that renews with the client relationship. eHealth clears 0.14x and SelectQuote 0.32x on businesses that must buy the next customer at the prevailing cost. EverQuote grew revenue 24.6% in the second quarter and still clears under 1x: growth in a business that re-buys its customers is priced as volume, not as an asset.

### Where core software sits

Insurance software is the only segment where the customer is contractually committed. Guidewire reported $1.15 billion of annual recurring revenue at 30 April 2026 against $1.04 billion a year earlier, and Verisk runs 83% of revenue on subscription at a 57.5% adjusted EBITDA margin. That is what the 9.1x median pays for, and why Advent took Sapiens private in August 2025 at roughly 4.4x trailing revenue.

## Does a better combined ratio produce a higher multiple?

Not in this cohort. Slide Insurance posted a 57.6% net combined ratio in Q2 2026, the strongest in the set, and clears 2.20x book. Hippo posted 95.8%, grew gross written premium 61.5%, and clears 1.89x, the lowest. Lemonade published no combined ratio, ran a 60% gross loss ratio, grew in-force premium 32.4%, and clears 8.27x, the highest.

What separates them is durability, not level. Slide and HCI Group both write Florida homeowners, the most catastrophe-exposed personal lines book in the country, and both sit at the bottom of the range. Their results were earned with no US landfalling hurricane. Kinsale, on a diversified excess and surplus book, ran 75.5% while shrinking premium and holds the second highest multiple. The market pays for a margin it expects to see again.

The catastrophe record supports that reading. Swiss Re Institute put first-half 2026 global insured losses at $42 billion against a ten-year first-half average of $50 billion; Munich Re put the period at $44 billion, with North America carrying $34 billion insured. NOAA assigns a 75% probability to a below-normal Atlantic season. Swiss Re Institute puts full-year losses on trend at $148 billion and calls 2025's below-trend outcome favourable variability rather than easing risk.

## What did buyers actually pay for insurtech assets in 2025 and 2026?

Six transactions define the period.

**Table 3. Notable Insurtech Transactions Announced in 2025 and 2026**

| Acquirer and target | Announced | Value | What the buyer acquired |
|---|---|---|---|
| Thoma Bravo / Accelerant | 13 Aug 2026 | over $4.0B | A specialty exchange, at $20.25 a share, a 49% premium |
| Advent International / Sapiens | 13 Aug 2025 | $2.5B | Core insurance software, a 64% premium |
| ERGO / Next Insurance | 20 Mar 2025 | $2.6B | A small commercial MGA, $548m of 2024 premium |
| WTW / Newfront | 10 Dec 2025 | up to $1.3B | A broker on a 20% organic revenue CAGR |
| Munich Re / At-Bay | 19 Aug 2026 | $575M | A cyber MGA, $278m of 2025 premium |
| Duck Creek / Send | 7 Jul 2026 | undisclosed | An underwriting engine carrying $26bn of premium |

*Source: Company announcements and SEC filings. The 2.07x and 4.74x premium multiples are Windsor Drake computations from disclosed consideration and premium, not company-stated figures.*

The two Munich Re transactions are the most instructive pair available. In March 2025 its ERGO arm acquired Next Insurance at a $2.6 billion valuation against $548 million of 2024 gross written premium, or 4.74x. In August 2026 the group agreed to acquire At-Bay at a $575 million enterprise value against $278 million of 2025 premium, or 2.07x. The same acquirer, seventeen months apart, at less than half the multiple. At-Bay's 2021 Series D was struck at $1.35 billion; the exit is 57% below it.

### The listing cohort, repriced

**Table 4. The 2025 and 2026 Listing Cohort, Marked to Market**

| Company | Listed | Issue price | Close, 21 Aug 2026 | Return |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethos | Jan 2026 | $19.00 | $34.16 | +79.8% |
| American Integrity | May 2025 | $16.00 | $25.35 | +58.4% |
| Ategrity | Jun 2025 | $17.00 | $25.84 | +52.0% |
| Slide Insurance | Jun 2025 | $17.00 | $22.74 | +33.8% |
| Aspen Insurance | May 2025 | $30.00 | $37.50 at delisting | +25.0% |
| Accelerant | Jul 2025 | $21.00 | $19.59 | -6.7% |

*Source: Company IPO pricing releases, SEC filings and closing prices, 21 August 2026. Aspen was acquired by Sompo and delisted 24 February 2026.*

Accelerant is the transaction a founder should study. It listed in July 2025 at $21.00 and closed at $13.59 on 12 August 2026, 35% below its issue price. Thoma Bravo announced a $20.25 offer the next day at a 49% premium, still 3.6% below the IPO price. A headline takeover premium and a negative return since listing were the same transaction. Premium to yesterday's close describes a trading day; the comparable set describes value.

## What is the underwriting and reinsurance backdrop for an insurtech exit?

Every input that flatters an insurtech profit and loss statement is near a cyclical best, and reinsurance has begun to give it back.

**Table 5. Underwriting and Reinsurance Conditions, Q3 2026**

| Measure | Level | As of | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| US P&C net combined ratio | 92.9% | FY2025 | AM Best; NAIC |
| US P&C combined ratio | 92.0% | Q1 2026 | AM Best |
| Forecast 2026 combined ratio | 96% to 97% | Dec 2025 | Fitch Ratings |
| Property cat reinsurance, mid-year | -16% | Jul 2026 | AM Best |
| Dedicated reinsurance capital | $705bn | 2026 estimate | AM Best and Guy Carpenter |
| Global insured cat losses | $42bn | H1 2026 | Swiss Re Institute |
| Homeowners approved rate change | +1.8% | 2026 to July | S&P Global Market Intelligence |

*Source: As named. Munich Re independently estimates H1 2026 global insured losses at $44 billion.*

Direction matters more than level. Thirty consecutive quarters of double-digit personal auto rate increases ended in March 2025, approved rate change fell from 9.7% in 2024 to 3.7% in 2025, and motor vehicle insurance in the Consumer Price Index fell 2.0% in June 2026 and 0.3% in July. Property catastrophe reinsurance fell 10% to 20% at the January renewals and 16% at mid-year, back at 2022 levels. Cheaper cession expands a reported net margin without any change in underwriting.

## What regulatory exposure will a buyer diligence?

Algorithmic underwriting became examinable in this cycle rather than merely discussed. Roughly half of US jurisdictions have adopted the NAIC Model Bulletin on the Use of AI Systems by Insurers, and the tooling arrived in 2026: the NAIC AI Systems Evaluation Tool entered a twelve-state pilot in March running through September, with adoption anticipated at the Fall National Meeting, and the Third-Party Data and Models Working Group closed its framework for comment on 5 August 2026.

Three states impose duties a buyer can test. Colorado extended Regulation 10-1-1 to private passenger automobile and health insurers effective 15 October 2025, with annual compliance reports beginning 1 July 2026. New York's Insurance Circular Letter No. 7 requires disparate-impact testing before an AI system enters production and audit rights in vendor contracts. Texas issued Commissioner's Bulletin B-0003-26 on 12 June 2026, requiring human review of consequential AI-driven decisions.

Overlaying this is a preemption question. Executive Order 14365, signed 11 December 2025, directs an AI Litigation Task Force to challenge state AI laws and contains no insurance carve-out. The NAIC objected on 16 December 2025, warning it could implicate routine rate-setting and claims tools, and until it resolves a buyer prices the uncertainty. The one documented insurtech enforcement outcome is modest by contrast: Pennsylvania's examination of Lemonade settled at $70,000 on 22 May 2025.

## Who is acquiring insurtech companies?

Distribution consolidators, by a wide margin. The Windsor Drake Exit Index recorded 29 insurtech rows for the third quarter of 2026, resolving to 26 distinct events, the largest sub-sector cohort in the quarter against twelve in wealthtech.

Sixteen of the 26 were agency or brokerage roll-up acquisitions. Inszone, King Risk Partners and Arthur J. Gallagher each transacted twice inside the quarter; World Insurance Associates, ALKEME, Trucordia, Westland, BrokerLink, Integrity, Insurance Office of America, Marsh McLennan Agency, Arrow Global and QDM International each once. Six were carriers or reinsurers buying underwriting capability, including Munich Re and At-Bay. Two were software vendors, Duck Creek acquiring Send and adesso a claims automation business. One was a sponsor and one a programme specialist. Windsor Drake's Fintech M&A Activity report for the quarter covers this cycle.

### What the transaction record discloses

An acquirer closing a transaction every few weeks holds a live view of what agency books trade for; a founder selling once has seen one price. That asymmetry closes on the evidence the seller brings, which is why every multiple here uses verifiable inputs.

**Table 6. Screened but Excluded, with Reason**

| Company | Reason for exclusion |
|---|---|
| Roper Technologies | Owns Vertafore and iPipeline inside an $8.3bn diversified group, neither separately reported |
| Oscar Health | Health benefit plan underwriter; the metric is a medical loss ratio, 79.2% |
| Clover Health | Medicare Advantage plan; an 87.6% benefits expense ratio, no combined ratio |

*Source: Windsor Drake analysis, 21 August 2026. Oscar clears 4.81x book and Clover 5.85x on the carrier computation.*

## Key Takeaways for Founders

### 1. Settle which side of the risk line you sit on before you anchor on a number

A buyer decides which denominator applies before deciding what number to put on it, and decides it from the balance sheet. Above the line the currency is revenue, at 4.9x; on the line it is book value, at 2.64x.

### 2. Distribution is two businesses, not one

Goosehead clears 7.3x on a renewing franchise book; eHealth clears 0.14x on transactional acquisition. The question a buyer answers is whether next year's revenue arrives without being bought again. Retention, renewal rate and acquisition cost by cohort settle it.

### 3. Premium growth alone will not lift a carrier's multiple

Hippo grew gross written premium 61.5% and holds the lowest price to book in the cohort; Kinsale shrank premium 5.0% and holds the second highest. What is priced is a margin the market expects to see again, so a result earned in a benign catastrophe year must be shown as structural.

### 4. Separate gross from net before diligence does it for you

State the quota share and the ceding commission explicitly, and show the margin at a normalised cession. Buyers discount a separation they discover themselves.

### 5. Build one buyer list ranked by cadence, not three ranked by type

For a distribution asset the universe is a roll-up platform list ranked by transaction cadence: three acquirers transacted twice in one quarter. For an underwriting or software asset it is a shorter list of carriers, reinsurers and core vendors, and the existing capacity partner is the most common buyer of all.

### 6. The conditions that make the numbers look their best are cyclical

A 92.9% industry combined ratio, catastrophe losses below the ten-year average, record reinsurance capacity and property catastrophe pricing down 16% at mid-year is a combination that historically reverts, and Fitch forecasts 96% to 97% for 2026. Repositioning takes twelve to eighteen months and a process six to nine more, so a founder intending to engage while these conditions hold is preparing now.

## Sources


- AM Best, US P/C 2025 results, Q1 2026 First Look and P/C Snapshot
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- S&P Global Market Intelligence, US homeowners rate filings
- NOAA, updated Atlantic hurricane season outlook
- US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index summary
- Federal Insurance Office, Annual Report on the Insurance Industry
- Colorado Division of Insurance, Regulation 10-1-1
- New York DFS, Insurance Circular Letter No. 7
- Texas Department of Insurance, Commissioner's Bulletin B-0003-26
- Pennsylvania Insurance Department, consent order
- Munich Re and ERGO, At-Bay and NEXT Insurance announcements
- Thoma Bravo, acquisition of Accelerant
- WTW and Duck Creek, Newfront and Send announcements
- US Securities and Exchange Commission, company filings


## Methodology Note

**Framework: The Risk Line.** Constituents are assigned by whether the business puts its own balance sheet behind an insurance policy, and above that line by whether the revenue renews without being re-acquired. Twenty-six listed companies were screened and 23 carried: fourteen bearing no underwriting risk on EV/Revenue, nine bearing it on price to book and combined ratio. The assignments are the firm's judgement, published so they can be argued with.

**Source standard.** Every figure is either computed by Windsor Drake from primary market data or attributed to a named institution with a date. Institutions cited are rating agencies, insurance regulators, the NAIC, Swiss Re Institute, Munich Re, the Federal Insurance Office, NOAA, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the major consultancies and primary filings. No licensed vendor multiples appear in this report.

**How the figures were computed.** Enterprise value equals market capitalisation plus total debt less cash and short-term investments, using the close on 21 August 2026 for every constituent other than Hippo Holdings, taken at 19 August, and Slide Insurance, at 20 August. Balance sheet, revenue, equity and premium figures come from each company's quarter ended 30 June 2026. Price to book uses total shareholders' equity as filed, excluding non-controlling interests.

**Derived estimates.** Four figures are Windsor Drake computations from disclosed inputs rather than company-stated multiples, identified as such where they appear: the 2.07x implied by Munich Re's At-Bay consideration against At-Bay's 2025 premium; the 4.74x implied by ERGO's Next Insurance valuation against its 2024 premium; the roughly 4.4x implied by Advent's Sapiens acquisition against its last reported revenue; and Accelerant's $13.59 close, derived from the stated $20.25 offer and 49% premium.

**Attribution and the transaction record.** Exit Index figures count distinct events after deduplication on acquirer, target and a fourteen-day announcement window: 29 rows for the third quarter of 2026 resolve to 26 transactions, and 58 insurtech rows to 55 events, within an index of 521 sourced transactions queried on 24 August 2026. Acquirer classification is the firm's own. Where two institutions publish different figures for one measure, both are named rather than averaged.