The direct answer

As of June 30, 2026, median public fintech valuations ranged from 2.2x to 5.0x forward revenue and 7.3x to 12.0x forward EBITDA across six major sectors in Houlihan Lokey’s sample. Private-company outcomes can differ materially; the relevant multiple depends on business model, growth, margins, retention, capital intensity, regulatory risk and buyer synergies.

EV / Revenue is enterprise value divided by revenue — 2026 estimated revenue for the public comps below, and announced enterprise value over publicly reported revenue for disclosed transactions. EV / EBITDA is enterprise value divided by earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, on the same estimate basis. Neither multiple is what a seller receives: equity value is enterprise value less net debt. See what an exit multiple measures.

Key takeaways

  • Public fintech valuations sit at five-year lows. At June 30, 2026, sector medians ranged from 2.2x (payments) to 5.0x (capital markets technology) EV / 2026E revenue and from 7.3x to 12.0x EV / 2026E EBITDA in Houlihan Lokey’s coverage universe.
  • Dispersion by business model matters more than any single number. Across fifteen public subsector baskets, median revenue multiples run from 0.8x (digital insurance distribution) to 5.6x (insurance software and data).
  • M&A is selective, not frozen. FT Partners reports $24.3B of fintech M&A across 371 deals in Q2 2026, down 20% year over year and the third consecutive quarterly decline — yet six fintech control transactions of US$575M or more were announced between July 30 and August 19, 2026 alone. Buyers are still paying for product, distribution, data, compliance and defensible scale.
  • Disclosed control transactions since 2020 cleared a median of 10.1x EV / Revenue — but that is a 20-deal, disclosure-biased sample spanning January 2020 to August 2026, split 12.2x on completed 2020–2021 deals versus 7.6x on completed deals announced since 2022. It is not a current universal multiple.
  • Private lower-middle-market outcomes require a calibration bridge, not a fixed discount. For size context only, GF Data’s all-sector average was 7.2x TTM adjusted EBITDA in 2025 and firmed to 7.3x in Q1 2026, with materially higher multiples in larger enterprise-value bands.

What are fintech companies trading for in public markets?

The freshest observable anchor for fintech valuation is the public market. The table below shows median and quartile EV / 2026E revenue and EV / 2026E EBITDA for the six major fintech sectors in Houlihan Lokey’s public-company universe, as of June 30, 2026.

Public fintech valuation multiples by sectorEV / 2026E revenue and EV / 2026E EBITDA · P25 / median / P75 · as of June 30, 2026
SectorRev P25Rev medianRev P75EBITDA P25EBITDA medianEBITDA P75How to use it
Capital Markets Tech2.8x5.0x7.9x8.4x12.0x14.3xSeparate data/software from volume-sensitive venues.
Financial Info & Analytics1.9x3.5x6.5x8.1x10.8x15.5xEmphasize recurring data revenue and retention.
Asset & Wealth Mgmt Tech2.6x3.3x5.2x8.3x9.8x12.1xDisclose AUM sensitivity and recurring-fee mix.
Banking & Lending Tech2.1x2.8x3.8x6.4x11.0x13.3xSegment software from balance-sheet lenders.
InsurTech0.8x2.7x4.3x6.4x10.8x13.6xSplit software/data, distribution and risk-bearing models.
Payments1.2x2.2x4.3x5.9x7.3x12.5xUse net revenue; separate processor and software models.

Medians and quartiles of EV / 2026E estimates within each sector of the source universe. Market observations, not transaction prices.

Source: Houlihan Lokey, Fintech Market Update, Q2 2026 · observed June 30, 2026 · forward estimates.

Sector medians hide the spread founders actually face. The subsector baskets below are the closest public proxies for common founder-company profiles, with the caveat that makes each one safe to use.

Founder-relevant public subsector proxiesMedian EV / 2026E revenue and EV / 2026E EBITDA · as of June 30, 2026
Founder-company profilePublic proxy basketEV / 2026E revenueEV / 2026E EBITDAMain caveat
Insurance software/dataPure-play insurance software/data5.6x12.2xAppropriate only for recurring software/data models.
BNPL / money accessMoney access and BNPL4.3x20.5xCredit cycle and funding costs can distort both metrics.
NeobankNeobanks and mobile banking3.7x15.7xDeposit economics and balance-sheet risk make SaaS comparisons unsafe.
Bank / BaaS infrastructureBanking and lending software3.4x11.7xImperfect proxy; no clean public pure-play BaaS basket.
B2B paymentsB2B payments3.3x10.7xSoftware, transaction-fee and working-capital mix matters.
Crypto platformCrypto / DeFi / Web33.1x18.7xCycle-sensitive; normalize revenue and EBITDA across a full cycle.
WealthtechWealth technology3.0x9.8xSeparate subscription, AUM-based and transaction revenue.
Trading/workflow softwareBuyside/sellside software2.9x8.3xRecurring-data/software businesses differ from exchanges and venues.
Digital lenderTech-enabled and marketplace lenders2.4x8.6xEquity metrics and credit performance may be more meaningful.
Merchant processor/acquirerMerchant acceptance and processing2.2x6.4xUse economically comparable net revenue, not pass-through-heavy gross revenue.
Vertical SaaS + paymentsVertical software and integrated payments2.1x11.8xDo not value all payment revenue as high-margin SaaS ARR.
Money transferMoney transfer2.0x8.6xFX, interest income, geography and compliance risk matter.
Fraud / KYC / GRCFinancial GRC and ID/fraud analytics1.8x8.1xSoftware and services mix varies materially.
Digital insurance carrierDigital insurance carriers0.9x15.3xCombined ratio, reserves, capital and book value matter more.
Digital insurance distributorDigital insurance distribution0.8x6.2xCommission economics differ from software.

Median EV / 2026E multiples for public subsector baskets. A public proxy is a starting point for calibration, not a private-company price.

Source: Houlihan Lokey, Fintech Market Update, Q2 2026 · observed June 30, 2026 · forward estimates.

What changed in fintech valuations in 2026?

Public trading multiples compressed to five-year lows — then firmed modestly. Houlihan Lokey’s Q2 2026 update reports that median public-fintech revenue and EBITDA valuations fell to their lowest levels in five years at June 30. Since that observation date, public fintech equities have recovered part of the ground: the Global X FinTech ETF (FINX) rose roughly 5% between June 30 and August 18, 2026 (price history). That is direction, not a re-basing — the June 30 medians above remain the latest institutional dataset, and the next quarterly print (September 30 observations) arrives in October. The market is not paying for growth alone; it is paying for profitable, defensible models — which is why the quartile spreads above are wide. The repricing also cuts both ways within payments: Fiserv’s August 6 results and full-year guidance cut left its shares down roughly 60% over twelve months (Fiserv investor news) — scaled legacy processing is being marked down even as it becomes carve-out supply.

M&A volume declined, but consolidation broadened through the summer. FT Partners’ Q2 2026 analysis reports $24.3B of fintech M&A across 371 deals, down 20% year over year, with total fintech deal activity falling for a third consecutive quarter. Then July and August produced a wave: six control transactions of US$575M or more announced in three weeks, banks divesting payments assets (BMO and RBC selling Moneris), and financial sponsors returning at scale (Thoma Bravo, Francisco Partners) — the pattern visible in the 2026 transactions below. Largest of all, media reports describe a rejected $53B approach to PayPal by Stripe and Advent International at $60.50 per share in July, with renewed negotiations reported by the Wall Street Journal in mid-August; no agreement has been announced, and all figures are media-reported rather than company-disclosed (status report). For deal-flow context, see fintech M&A activity in 2026.

The sector itself kept growing — a context layer, not a valuation input. The BCG / FT Partners Global FinTech Report 2026 reports $504B of 2025 sector revenue, up 22%, with 74% of the largest public fintechs profitable, and counts 1,737 fintech M&A deals totaling $227B in 2025. KPMG’s Pulse of Fintech separately reports $116B of global fintech investment across 4,719 deals in 2025; its H1 2026 edition had not published as of August 20, 2026. These datasets track different populations with different inclusion rules; this page never blends them into one transaction count, and neither should a valuation analysis.

Private funding tightened in Q2 2026 — and even the trackers disagree. CB Insights’ State of Fintech Q2 2026 (published August 5) counts $11.7B of global fintech funding, down 20% quarter over quarter, across 726 deals — the fewest in more than four years — with only 4 fintech IPOs. PitchBook’s Q2 2026 fintech report, measuring a different universe with different inclusion rules, shows fintech VC up, at $13.3B across 461 deals. The divergence is the lesson: funding data is population-dependent, and none of it is a control-transaction price.

What do recent fintech M&A deals imply?

Nine control transactions announced between June 15 and August 20, 2026 show what buyers are underwriting right now — strategics buying capability, banks divesting payments assets, and financial sponsors returning at scale. Each row states its value basis and whether the multiple is company-stated or Windsor Drake–calculated; none of them is a market median.

Verified 2026 transaction cross-checkControl transactions announced June 15 – August 20, 2026 · value basis and multiple status stated per row
AnnouncedTransactionHeadline value (basis)Multiple (status)Required qualificationSource
Aug 19, 2026Munich Re / At-Bay$575M (enterprise value, company-stated)None published or safely computableMGA economics: company-stated $278M gross written premium and $23M cyber fee revenue (Dec 31, 2025) are different denominators — premium is not revenue. Close expected Q1 2027.Munich Re release
Aug 13, 2026Thoma Bravo / Accelerant>$4B (enterprise value, company-stated); $20.25/share cashNot company-statedSponsor take-private of a NYSE-listed insurance risk exchange at a 49% premium; target financials are public in its SEC filings. Close expected H1 2027.Thoma Bravo release
Aug 10, 2026Francisco Partners / Moneris~C$2.0B (cash consideration)None — no target financials disclosedBMO and RBC each sell their 50% of Canada’s largest processor to a financial sponsor, with long-term referral agreements. Close expected by the banks’ fiscal Q1 2027.Moneris release
Aug 4, 2026Dominion Lending Centres / FilogixC$58.5M (cash, subject to adjustments)~3.3x–3.9x expected first-year adjusted EBITDA contribution (calculated)Calculated from the company-stated C$15–18M expected adjusted EBITDA contribution in the first twelve months post-close — a forward contribution basis, not trailing standalone EBITDA. Carve-out from Finastra.DLC release
Aug 3, 2026Visa / BioCatch$2.4B (cash consideration)~13.0x value / reported year-end 2025 ARR (calculated)Calculated using media-reported >$185M ARR; a strategic outlier, not a market median.Visa announcement
Jul 30, 2026ICE / MarketAxess~$5.7B (enterprise value)~10.6x adjusted EBITDA (company-stated)Official multiple is pro forma for full run-rate expense synergies, not standalone EBITDA.ICE announcement; SEC materials
Jul 30, 2026TMX Group / MEMX + BOX~US$2.3B (implied transaction value of the combined MEMX Group)~8.2x 2025 combined revenue; ~17.2x 2025 combined adjusted EBITDA (calculated)Strategic combination, not a clean 100% acquisition: TMX contributes ~US$800M cash plus its BOX stake for ~59% ownership. Calculated from company-stated combined 2025 revenue of ~US$280M and adjusted EBITDA of ~US$134M. Close expected H2 2027.Joint release
Jul 7, 2026Equifax / Círculo de Crédito$825M (purchase price); $750M (enterprise value, company-stated: price net of ~$75M cash, no debt)~5.6x revenue; ~12.1x adjusted EBITDA (calculated)Calculated from company-stated revenue of $134M (+31%) and adjusted EBITDA of $62M for the twelve months ended June 30, 2026 — the cleanest disclosure of the window. Close expected Q4 2026.Equifax release
Jun 15, 2026Nuvei / Payoneer$2.75B (equity value); ~$2.3B (estimated EV)~2.0x EV / 2026E revenue; ~7.4x EV / 2026E adjusted EBITDA (calculated)Calculated from Reuters’ estimated EV and management projections in the merger proxy; not company-stated multiples. HSR early termination granted July 28, 2026; stockholder vote set for September 14, 2026.Nuvei announcement; merger proxy; Reuters EV estimate

Nuvei / Payoneer also appears in the Fintech Exit Index below at 2.4x, computed on announced EV over publicly reported revenue per the Index methodology; the ~2.0x here uses 2026E projected revenue. Same deal, different disclosed denominators — both are labeled.

For the founder-relevant end of the market, megadeals are poor comps. Deluxe’s acquisition of Celero Commerce — announced June 18 and closed July 31, 2026 — is a more relevant SMB-payments example: $625M cash for a business with over $200M of 2025 revenue and a 28% adjusted EBITDA margin, implying upper-bound headline multiples of roughly 3.1x revenue and 11.2x standalone EBITDA before synergies (calculated). The Filogix carve-out above is the truest lower-middle-market datapoint in the window — and a reminder that at that size, disclosure this complete is the exception.

The complete disclosed-deal record — every transaction, source and computed multiple — lives in the Windsor Drake Fintech Exit Index below.

Windsor Drake Fintech Exit Index: Disclosed M&A Multiples

The Windsor Drake Fintech Exit Index is a hand-curated record of verified fintech M&A transactions across every major fintech subsector. Every row carries a public source: a company announcement, a regulatory filing or credible trade press. Multiples are computed only where both enterprise value and revenue are public.

Transactions tracked

240+

Across 23 fintech subsectors

Computable multiples

20

Deals where EV and revenue are both public

Coverage window

2020–2026

Announced Jan 2020 through Aug 2026

Median disclosed multiple

10.1x

EV / Revenue, n=20, disclosure-biased sample

Disclosed-deal ledger — all computable transactionsAnnounced EV over publicly reported revenue at announcement · Jan 2020 – Aug 2026 · n=20
TransactionAnnouncedSubsectorEV ($M)Revenue ($M)EV / RevenueSource
Visa / TinkJun 2021Regtech & open banking2,1504350.0xSource
Block / AfterpayAug 2021Lending & BNPL29,000925 ‡42.0xSource
Bill.com / DivvyMay 2021Banking & payments infra.2,50010025.0xSource
Nasdaq / VerafinNov 2020Regtech & open banking2,75014019.6xSource
Nasdaq / AdenzaJun 2023Capital markets & mortgage tech10,50059017.8xSource
SoFi / TechnisysFeb 2022Banking & payments infra.1,1007015.7xSource
Rocket / TruebillFeb 2021Financial data & open banking1,27510012.8xSource
ICE / Ellie MaeAug 2020Capital markets & mortgage tech11,00090012.2xSource
SoFi / GalileoApr 2020Banking & payments infra.1,20010012.0xSource
FactSet / CUSIPDec 2021Capital markets & mortgage tech1,92517511.0xSource
Roper / VertaforeAug 2020Insurtech5,3505909.1xSource
Mastercard / Recorded FutureSep 2024Regtech & open banking2,6503008.8xSource
ICE / Black KnightMay 2022Capital markets & mortgage tech11,8001,5507.6xSource
Equifax / Círculo de CréditoJul 2026Financial data & open banking7501345.6x †Source
Thoma Bravo / BottomlineJan 2022Treasury & cash management2,6004945.3x *Source
Nuvei / PayaJan 2023Payments processing1,3002774.7xSource
Goldman Sachs / GreenSkySep 2021Lending & BNPL2,2405264.3xSource
GTCR / WorldpayJul 2023Payments processing18,5004,9003.8xSource
NEC / AvaloqOct 2020Financial data & open banking2,2006603.4xSource
Nuvei / PayoneerJun 2026Payments processing2,3009782.4x †Source

* Annualized revenue basis. ‡ Revenue as reported in A$ (FY21 total income A$924.7M); the 42.0x multiple is computed on the USD-equivalent revenue of roughly $690M against the US$29.0B announced value. † In progress; computed on announced EV over publicly reported revenue — see the 2026E-basis calculation in the cross-check above. Download the dataset: Fintech Exit Index comps (CSV, August 2026).

Median disclosed EV / Revenue by subsectorComputed from the ledger above · cells with fewer than 3 observations are suppressed
SubsectorMedian EV / RevenueRangeDeals (n)
Regtech, compliance and open banking19.6x8.8x–50.0x3
Banking and payments infrastructure15.7x12.0x–25.0x3
Capital markets and mortgage technology11.6x7.6x–17.8x4
Financial data & open banking5.6x3.4x–12.8x3
Payments processing3.8x2.4x–4.7x3
All disclosed transactions10.1x2.4x–50.0x20
Lending and BNPLSuppressed<3
InsurtechSuppressed<3
WealthtechSuppressed<3
Median disclosed EV / Revenue by transaction size bandAnnounced enterprise value · computed from the ledger above
Announced enterprise valueMedian EV / RevenueRangeDeals (n)
Under $1.5 billion12.0x4.7x–15.7x5
$1.5 billion to $3 billion8.8x2.4x–50.0x9
Above $3 billion10.7x3.8x–42.0x6

Deals under roughly $1 billion in enterprise value rarely disclose terms, so published multiples skew toward large transactions.

What the Index shows beneath the headline median

The 10.1x median is a disclosed-deal artifact, not a market price. The era split matters more: computed from the ledger above, the median was 12.2x on completed 2020–2021 announcements and 7.6x on completed deals announced since the start of 2022 (pending transactions excluded). The market repriced and stayed repriced. EBITDA multiples are rarely quotable in fintech M&A because they are rarely public — EBITDA was disclosed in only 2 of the 240+ tracked transactions (Adenza at 31.0x, Vertafore at 18.4x). And the buyer base is historically lopsided: 98% of Index transactions involved strategic or PE-backed strategic acquirers, against 2% pure financial sponsors. That mix is now shifting at the margin — the July–August 2026 wave included sponsor-led control deals at scale (Thoma Bravo / Accelerant, Francisco Partners / Moneris) — but the clearing price is still usually set by strategics buying capability, licensing or distribution they would otherwise build. More on who buys fintech companies.

Index inclusion rules

The Index covers control transactions in fintech operating companies announced January 2020 through August 2026. SPAC mergers, bank charter acquisitions, insurance agency roll-ups, minority stakes and duplicates are excluded from multiple computation. EV / Revenue is announced enterprise value over last-twelve-month or current-year revenue as publicly reported at announcement, computed only where both figures are public: 20 of the 240+ tracked transactions qualify. Any cell with fewer than 3 observations is suppressed rather than reported. The computed benchmark contains only sourced, disclosed figures; estimated ranges elsewhere on this page are advisory and always labeled as estimates. The Index is refreshed quarterly and on qualifying announcements, updated in place at this URL. Last Index refresh: August 20, 2026 (added Equifax / Círculo de Crédito; all medians recomputed).

How should a private fintech company be valued?

The most defensible answer for a founder-owned fintech is not “public multiple minus X%.” There is no universal private discount. The credible method is a calibration bridge:

  1. Start from the right anchors. Use the relevant public subsector quartiles above and comparable disclosed control transactions from the Exit Index — not an all-fintech average.
  2. Align the metric basis. Same denominator, same period, same definition. Net revenue against net revenue; forward estimates against forward estimates. Most bad comps die here.
  3. Bridge for the differences buyers price. Scale, recurring-revenue quality, growth, profitability, customer concentration, retention, capital intensity, regulatory exposure, control and buyer-specific synergies each move the multiple; the direction is knowable, the magnitude is company-specific.
  4. Convert enterprise value to equity value. Deduct net debt, adjust for working-capital targets and any structure (rollover, earnouts). The equity number is what a seller receives.

For size context only: GF Data’s lower-middle-market data shows a 7.2x average TTM adjusted-EBITDA purchase multiple across all sectors for 2025, firming to 7.3x across 80 completed transactions in Q1 2026 (published May 19, 2026), with both volume and pricing above full-year 2025 levels. Its size-premium data (first nine months of 2025) makes the scale effect concrete: 5.9x at $10–25M enterprise value, 6.6x at $25–50M, 8.7x at $50–100M and 10.0x at $100–250M. All of that is general lower-middle-market calibration, not fintech-specific data — it belongs in the bridge as a size reference, never as a fintech benchmark.

Where this page presents a private-company adjustment, it is a Windsor Drake estimate based on advisory experience, and is labeled as such. Estimates are judgment, not market observations.

Windsor Drake runs this calibration confidentially for founder-led fintech and payments companies — anchored to your metrics, not generic averages. Discuss a potential sale ›

Which valuation metric fits which fintech business model?

More fintech valuations go wrong on the denominator than on the multiple. The metric must follow the business model:

Metric-by-model guidePrimary valuation basis by fintech business model
Business modelPrimary metric(s)WhyCommon error
Payments processor / merchant acquirerEV / net revenue; EV / EBITDANet revenue reflects economics the company keeps.Valuing on TPV, GMV or pass-through-heavy gross revenue.
Vertical SaaS with embedded paymentsSplit basis: ARR for software, net revenue for paymentsThe two revenue streams carry different margins and durability.Valuing all payment revenue as high-margin SaaS ARR.
Lender / balance-sheet modelP/E, P/B, ROE plus credit qualityEarnings and book value capture credit risk; revenue does not.Applying EV / revenue to interest income.
NeobankDeposit economics, unit economics, P/B where matureDeposit franchise and balance-sheet risk drive value.Comping a neobank against SaaS multiples.
Insurance carrier (risk-bearing)P/B, combined ratio, reserve qualityUnderwriting result and capital matter more than revenue.Using software multiples for a carrier.
Insurance software / distributionEV / revenue or ARR (software); commission economics (distribution)Recurring software and commission models price differently.Blending carrier, software and distribution comps.
BaaS infrastructureNearest software proxy, heavily caveatedNo clean public pure-play BaaS basket exists.Citing a “BaaS multiple” as if one were observable.
Crypto platformCycle-normalized revenue and EBITDAReported figures swing with the crypto cycle.Annualizing a cycle peak (or trough) quarter.

For software businesses without payments economics, see SaaS valuation benchmarks.

What drives fintech valuation multiples up or down?

Two companies in the same subsector can trade turns apart. These are the drivers buyers consistently price, stated as directions rather than false-precision premiums:

Valuation driversDriver · direction of impact · evidence and limitation
DriverDirection of impactEvidence / limitation
Revenue growthHigher durable growth supports higher revenue multiples.Visible in public quartile spreads; growth without margin no longer clears premium multiples.
Gross margin and revenue qualitySoftware-like margins and net-revenue clarity price above processing-heavy mixes.Payments processing medians sit well below software subsectors in both public comps and the Exit Index.
EBITDA and free-cash-flow conversionProfitability now expands the eligible buyer universe and the multiple basis.Houlihan Lokey’s Q2 2026 compression was mildest for profitable models; 74% of the largest public fintechs are profitable (BCG / FT Partners).
Net revenue retention and churnNRR above 100% supports premium recurring-revenue treatment.Retention must be documented from systems, not asserted.
Customer concentrationConcentration compresses multiples and invites structure (earnouts, escrows).Direction is consistent across processes; magnitude is deal-specific.
Capital intensity and balance-sheet dependencyCapital-light models price above balance-sheet-dependent ones.Disclosed samples are too thin to quantify the premium honestly; treat any fixed “capital-light premium” figure with suspicion.
Regulatory posture and licensingLicenses (MTLs, charters, registrations) add value; unresolved exposure subtracts it.Buyers price both current utility and optionality; verification happens in diligence.
Strategic fit and synergiesStrategic buyers can underwrite synergies financial sponsors cannot, and set most clearing prices.98% of Exit Index transactions historically had strategic or PE-backed strategic buyers, though mid-2026 brought sponsor-led control deals at scale; premium size varies by deal and is rarely disclosed.

How a valuation bridge works in practice

Illustrative only — not a quote, a forecast or an average. The mechanics matter more than the inputs:

Take a payments-software company with $12M of net revenue, 25% growth, 20% EBITDA margins and no customer above 8% of revenue. Anchoring between the vertical-software-and-integrated-payments proxy (2.1x) and the B2B payments proxy (3.3x), then adjusting up for retention and down for scale, a calibrated range might be 3.0x–4.5x net revenue, implying $36M–$54M of enterprise value (Windsor Drake estimate, illustrative). With $4M of net debt, that is $32M–$50M of equity value before structure. Each half-turn of multiple moves equity value by $6M — which is why the bridge inputs, not the headline multiple, are where a sale process is won. See how a competitive sell-side process converts calibration into price.

What this means for sellers and buyers

Strategic acquirers underwrite capability, licensing, distribution and synergies — they set most fintech clearing prices, and they pay for what they would otherwise have to build. Financial sponsors underwrite growth durability, margin expansion and platform potential, and compete through structure: rollover equity, management incentives and earnouts that can make the total package competitive. A process that engages both buyer types, run against the evidence on this page, is how the range converts to a price — see who buys fintech companies and Windsor Drake’s fintech M&A advisory practice.

For a founder 12–24 months out, the preparation checklist is short: present metrics in the frameworks buyers use (net revenue, NRR, cohort retention, EBITDA bridge); document revenue quality and concentration; resolve known regulatory and compliance gaps; and know your subsector’s current quartiles rather than a 2021 anchor. Sellers anchored to 2021 comparables are the most common reason a process stalls.

Methodology, limitations and change log

Universe and sources

Public trading comps: Houlihan Lokey’s fintech coverage universe, EV / 2026E revenue and EV / 2026E EBITDA, medians and quartiles, observed June 30, 2026. Deal activity context: FT Partners (Q2 2026 and Global FinTech Report 2026, with BCG) and KPMG Pulse of Fintech — distinct populations, never combined. Lower-middle-market size context: GF Data, all sectors. Disclosed transactions: the Windsor Drake Fintech Exit Index, per the inclusion rules above. Source hierarchy: company announcements and regulatory filings first, then investor-relations materials, then credible trade press.

Formulas and conventions

All figures USD. Public multiples use consensus forward estimates (2026E); Index multiples use announced enterprise value over last-twelve-month or current-year revenue as publicly reported at announcement. Forward trading multiples and historical transaction multiples are not directly comparable and are never blended on this page. Every calculated multiple states its numerator, denominator and status (company-stated, calculated, or Windsor Drake estimate). Cells with fewer than 3 observations are suppressed.

Limitations

Disclosed M&A samples are biased toward larger, more transparent deals. Public comps reflect market sentiment on the observation date and move daily. Private-company adjustments require judgment and are presented as Windsor Drake estimates, not market facts. This page is research, not a fairness opinion or a valuation conclusion for any specific company.

Change log

  • August 20, 2026 (data refresh) — Added six verified control transactions announced July 7–August 19, 2026 to the cross-check; added Equifax / Círculo de Crédito to the Exit Index ledger (n=20; median recomputed to 10.1x; financial-data subsector now reportable; era split restated as 12.2x / 7.6x, computed from the public ledger with pending deals excluded); GF Data updated to the Q1 2026 print with size-band detail; Q2 2026 private-funding context added (CB Insights, PitchBook); Deluxe / Celero closing and Nuvei / Payoneer vote date noted; market-movement note added — public comps remain as of June 30, 2026, the latest institutional dataset.
  • August 20, 2026 — Page rebuilt. Public comps re-based to June 30, 2026 observations; Fintech Exit Index merged into this page as a permanent module; claim ledger, metric-by-model guide and valuation bridge added; superseded ranges removed.
  • June 11, 2026 — Fintech Exit Index quarterly refresh (coverage through June 2026).

This page is refreshed quarterly and on material market events; tables, sources and the change log update together.

Frequently asked questions

What is the average revenue multiple for a fintech company?

There is no single average worth using. At June 30, 2026, median public fintech sectors traded between 2.2x and 5.0x EV / 2026E revenue. Across disclosed control transactions since 2020, the median was 10.1x EV / Revenue — a 20-deal, disclosure-biased sample ranging from 2.4x to 50.0x. Subsector and revenue quality decide where a specific company lands.

What multiple should a payments company expect in a sale?

On a net-revenue basis. Public merchant acceptance and processing comps carried a 2.2x median EV / 2026E revenue at June 30, 2026, while disclosed processing transactions cleared a median of 3.8x (range 2.4x–4.7x). Companies selling payments software rather than processing volume price materially higher — disclosed banking and payments infrastructure deals cleared a 15.7x median. The market pays for software economics, not volume.

How do public trading multiples and private-company multiples differ?

Public multiples price liquid minority stakes in large companies on forward estimates; private lower-middle-market transactions price control of smaller companies, usually on trailing figures, with illiquidity, concentration and scale differences working against the seller and control value and synergies working for them. That is why this page publishes a calibration bridge rather than a universal discount — the net effect is company-specific.

When is EBITDA the right valuation basis for a fintech company?

When profitability is established and growth is moderate, EBITDA (or a revenue/EBITDA combination) is usually primary — and for well-run companies it can produce the higher implied value. In fintech M&A specifically, EBITDA multiples are rarely quotable because they are rarely disclosed: 2 of the 240+ transactions tracked in the Exit Index published one (Adenza at 31.0x, Vertafore at 18.4x).

How does net debt change what a seller actually receives?

Multiples produce enterprise value; sellers receive equity value. Equity value is enterprise value minus net debt, adjusted for working-capital targets and any structure such as earnouts or rollover. A company at 4.0x on $12M of net revenue has $48M of enterprise value — but $5M of net debt makes it $43M of equity value before structure. Always negotiate on a defined bridge.

Why do M&A multiples look higher than public trading multiples?

Three compounding reasons: control transactions include a premium for control and buyer synergies; disclosed deals skew toward strategic, high-multiple acquisitions because small and low-multiple deals rarely publish terms; and Index multiples use reported trailing revenue while trading comps here use 2026 estimates. Comparing the 10.1x disclosed median to the 2.2x–5.0x public medians without those qualifications is a category error.

Have fintech valuation multiples recovered to 2021 levels?

No. Disclosed transaction medians split 12.2x on completed 2020–2021 deals versus 7.6x on completed deals since 2022, and public medians reached five-year lows in mid-2026 before firming modestly through August. The market repriced and stayed repriced — selectively rewarding profitable, defensible models. Sellers anchored to a 2021 comparable are the most common reason a process stalls. Founders weighing the timing question can work through it in should you sell your fintech company.

Know what your fintech business is worth.

Windsor Drake advises founder-led fintech and payments companies on sell-side M&A. A confidential valuation applies the calibration on this page to your metrics — subsector quartiles, comparable transactions and a full enterprise-to-equity bridge.

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