What is an earnout?

An earnout is contingent consideration: part of the purchase price paid only if the business hits defined targets after close. A $20M offer with a $6M earnout is a $14M offer plus a conditional promise. The promise has value only to the extent the contract makes it collectable.

Earnouts appear when the buyer and the seller disagree about the future. The seller projects growth, the buyer will not pay firm cash for projections, and the earnout defers the argument to the scoreboard. This page covers the mechanics; the situation-specific version for a founder holding an earnout-heavy offer is the mostly-earnout guide in the offer-received hub.

Which earnout metric should a seller prefer?

Sellers should prefer revenue, accept gross profit only with protections, and resist EBITDA. That hierarchy is standard deal guidance, and the logic is about who controls the number after close.

Revenue is the safest metric because a buyer cannot suppress it without damaging the asset the buyer just bought, and because revenue is measurable from billing records. Gross profit sits in the middle: cost allocations into COGS give the buyer room to move the number. EBITDA is the most manipulable metric, because group overhead allocations, management fees, and integration costs all land above the measurement line at the buyer’s discretion.

The metric also interacts with the buyer’s plan. An EBITDA earnout combined with a planned integration is close to uncollectable, because integration reallocates costs by design.

Which terms decide whether an earnout actually pays?

Six terms decide collectability: metric definition, measurement period, P&L control, acceleration, audit rights, and dispute mechanics. The headline size of the earnout matters less than any one of them.

Metric definition should reference the company’s historical accounting policies and attach a worked sample calculation as an exhibit. Measurement period should stay at 12 to 24 months, because every additional year adds drift between the business that was priced and the business being measured. P&L control means an operating covenant: the business runs standalone, on an agreed budget, with no reallocated group overhead during the measurement period.

Acceleration pays the earnout in full if the buyer resells the business, undergoes a change of control, or integrates operations in a way that destroys the metric. Audit rights give the seller access to the books and a path to an independent accountant. Dispute mechanics should name expert determination rather than litigation, because a seller who must sue to collect has usually already lost the economics.

Earnout term Seller-protective version Buyer-favorable version
Metric Revenue, defined by historical accounting policies with a sample calculation attached EBITDA after group allocations set at the buyer’s discretion
Measurement period 12 to 24 months Three to five years across an integration
P&L control Standalone operating covenant with an agreed budget Buyer runs the business as it sees fit
Acceleration Full payout on resale, change of control, or metric-destroying integration No acceleration under any event
Audit rights Books access plus referral to an independent accountant Buyer’s calculation is final absent manifest error
Payout curve Pro-rata payment starting at a low threshold All-or-nothing cliff at 100 percent of target

Why do buyers push earnouts in bilateral deals?

Buyers push earnouts in bilateral deals because an earnout converts firm price into contingent price at no cost to the buyer. The earnout bridges a gap the seller cannot verify from inside a one-buyer negotiation: the seller never learns whether the growth story would have priced as cash under competition.

An earnout-heavy bilateral offer is one of the standard forms The Proprietary Discount takes. The Proprietary Discount is the gap between what a serial acquirer pays in an unbanked bilateral negotiation and what the same business clears in a competitive process, and Windsor Drake puts that gap at 15 to 25 percent of enterprise value. In a competitive process, a bidder who wants the asset must move contingent dollars to cash at close, because a rival bid will. Windsor Drake publishes the measured gap quarterly in The Windsor Drake Proprietary Discount Index.

Perpetual holders change one clause and not the others. Volaris and Valsoft hold what they buy permanently, so acceleration on resale costs them little to grant. The terms to fight for with a permanent holder are P&L control and overhead allocation, because the acquired company reports into a group structure from day one.

What does a $20M offer with a $6M earnout actually pay?

A $20M headline with a $6M earnout pays between $14M and $20M, and the terms decide where in that range the seller lands. The numbers that follow are hypothetical and exist to show the mechanics.

Scenario one, tight terms: revenue metric, 24-month period, standalone covenant honored, targets hit. The seller collects the full $6M and total consideration reaches $20M.

Scenario two, loose terms and ordinary integration: EBITDA metric, the buyer allocates group overhead into the P&L, the target misses, and a partial payout schedule pays $2M. Total consideration is $16M, and no term was breached; the structure worked exactly as written.

Scenario three, integration wipes out the metric: the buyer merges operations in month six, the metric becomes unmeasurable, the buyer calculates zero, and the dispute clause routes through litigation the seller declines to fund. Total consideration is $14M. A seller comparing two offers should therefore compare cash at close plus a probability-weighted earnout, never headline against headline.

When is an earnout acceptable?

An earnout is acceptable when it bridges a genuine growth-story gap on seller-protective terms. Four conditions mark the acceptable case: the seller is projecting growth the buyer genuinely cannot verify, the period is 12 to 24 months, the metric is revenue, and an operating covenant caps integration interference during the measurement window.

An acceptable earnout is also a minority of total consideration. Contingent money can top up a strong cash price; contingent money should not be the price.

When should a seller refuse an earnout?

A seller should refuse an earnout built on an EBITDA metric, buyer P&L discretion, and a planned integration, because that combination prices near zero. Refusal is also right when the measurement period runs past two years, when audit and dispute rights are missing, or when the earnout is most of the deal.

Structure also drifts between LOI and close. One in three signed LOIs fails to close on original terms, and the earnout is a common place the deterioration lands, so a seller should fix earnout terms in the LOI rather than leave them to definitive documents.

What should a seller trade for in an earnout negotiation?

The best trade in an earnout negotiation is size for certainty: a smaller earnout at certain terms beats a bigger earnout at loose terms. In a hypothetical comparison, a $4M revenue-based earnout over 18 months with a standalone covenant is worth more than a $6M EBITDA earnout over three years, even though the headline reads smaller.

Other trades follow the same logic. Trade headline optics for cash at close. Trade an all-or-nothing cliff for a pro-rata payout curve starting at a low threshold. Trade a longer founder commitment for acceleration rights the buyer resists, because acceleration is the clause that protects every other clause.

If the offer in front of you leans on an earnout to reach its headline, Windsor Drake’s Approach Response engagement prices the contingent portion and builds the competitive alternative that moves it to cash.

Questions founders ask

What percentage of a deal should an earnout be?

An earnout should be a minority of total consideration, and roughly 10 to 30 percent is the commonly cited workable band. An earnout that is most of the price converts the sale into a bet on the buyer’s post-close behavior. Windsor Drake treats majority-earnout offers as structures to renegotiate, not accept.

Are earnouts usually paid in full?

Earnouts frequently pay less than the headline, because the metric is measured under the buyer’s ownership and often under the buyer’s accounting choices. Collection risk concentrates in EBITDA metrics, measurement periods past two years, and deals with planned integration. Sellers should value an earnout at a probability-weighted number, not face value.

What is the safest earnout metric for a seller?

Revenue is the safest earnout metric for a seller, because a buyer cannot suppress revenue without damaging the acquired business and because revenue is verifiable from billing records. Gross profit is exposed to cost allocation, and EBITDA is exposed to overhead allocation, management fees, and integration costs.

What is an acceleration clause in an earnout?

An acceleration clause pays the earnout in full when a defined event makes the metric unmeasurable or moot, typically a resale of the business, a change of control, or an integration that collapses the standalone P&L. Acceleration is the seller’s core protection, because it removes the buyer’s ability to restructure the earnout away.

Why do buyers prefer earnouts over price reductions?

A price reduction costs the buyer the full amount with certainty, while an earnout costs the buyer only if targets are hit under the buyer’s own ownership and accounting. In bilateral negotiations an earnout also preserves an impressive headline while shifting risk to the seller, which is one form The Proprietary Discount takes.

Can I negotiate earnout terms after signing the LOI?

Negotiating position peaks before exclusivity, so earnout mechanics belong in the LOI itself. Standard exclusivity asks run 30 to 90 days, with 30 to 45 days the recommended grant, and one in three signed LOIs fails to close on original terms. Terms left vague at LOI stage tend to resolve in the buyer’s favor.

Key Facts

  • An earnout is contingent consideration tied to post-close performance, and what a seller collects depends on terms, not the headline.
  • Revenue metrics collect most reliably, gross profit sits in the middle, and EBITDA is the easiest for a buyer to suppress after close.
  • Metric definition, measurement period, P&L control, acceleration, audit rights, and dispute mechanics decide the outcome.
  • A smaller earnout on tight terms beats a bigger earnout on loose terms.

The Proprietary Discount

The Proprietary Discount is the gap between what a serial acquirer pays in an unbanked bilateral negotiation and what the same business clears in a competitive process. Windsor Drake publishes the measurement as The Windsor Drake Proprietary Discount Index.

Holding an Offer?

Windsor Drake is a boutique sell-side M&A advisory firm representing founder-led companies in the lower middle market, with offices in Toronto and New York.

Every conversation is confidential and without obligation. Approach Response ›