SaaS M&A Research · Windsor Drake BenchmarkUpdated October 21, 2026Reflects Q3 2026 data: Windsor Drake composite (21 Aug 2026), Clouded Judgment (25 Sep 2026), SEG Q2 2026Refreshed quarterly, updated in place$750M+ in technology transaction value advised since 2018
By Jeff Barrington, Founder & Managing Director
In brief
Public SaaS ended Q3 2026 at a median 4.2x EV/NTM revenue (Clouded Judgment, 25 September 2026). In private markets, Software Equity Group priced the median SaaS M&A deal at 4.0x EV/TTM revenue in Q2 2026, above its 3.2x public index median. Founder-led lower middle market companies mostly clear 3x to 6.5x ARR, and the top quartile of disclosed deals prices above 8x, usually with the Rule of 40 cleared and net revenue retention above 115 percent.
Public EV/TTM revenue history (SEG SaaS Index quarterly medians, dated Aventis observations and the Windsor Drake 34-constituent composite at 21 August 2026), an estimates-based EV/NTM view by growth cohort as of 25 September 2026, the private-deal view including realized 2026 software transactions, and peer segments on trailing and forward bases. Every point carries its source, basis and date; nothing is interpolated.
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SEG SaaS Index median EV/TTM revenue: 4.2x. Daily median shown on the SEG index page, 22 Sep 2026. Quarter-end 2Q26: 3.2x (Software Equity Group, 2Q26 SaaS M&A and Public Market Report (retrieved 2026-09-22)). Dated Aventis observations (S&P Capital IQ) shown as markers; gaps are gaps, nothing is interpolated.
| Series | Date | Value | Class | Note / source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEG SaaS Index median EV/TTM revenue | Dec 2024 | 6.3x | Public trading | 4Q24 Software Equity Group, 2026 Annual SaaS Report |
| SEG SaaS Index median EV/TTM revenue | Mar 2025 | 6.4x | Public trading | 1Q25 Software Equity Group, 2026 Annual SaaS Report |
| SEG SaaS Index median EV/TTM revenue | Jun 2025 | 5.3x | Public trading | 2Q25 Software Equity Group, 2026 Annual SaaS Report |
| SEG SaaS Index median EV/TTM revenue | Sep 2025 | 5.3x | Public trading | 3Q25 (annual report shows 5.2x) Software Equity Group, 2Q26 SaaS M&A and Public Market Report |
| SEG SaaS Index median EV/TTM revenue | Dec 2025 | 4.9x | Public trading | 4Q25 (annual report shows 4.8x) Software Equity Group, 2Q26 SaaS M&A and Public Market Report |
| SEG SaaS Index median EV/TTM revenue | Mar 2026 | 3.7x | Public trading | 1Q26 Software Equity Group, 2Q26 SaaS M&A and Public Market Report |
| SEG SaaS Index median EV/TTM revenue | Jun 2026 | 3.2x | Public trading | 2Q26 Software Equity Group, 2Q26 SaaS M&A and Public Market Report |
| SEG SaaS Index median EV/TTM revenue | Sep 22, 2026 | 4.2x | Public trading | Daily median shown on the SEG index page, 22 Sep 2026 SEG SaaS Index page (daily median, financial data by Tiingo) |
| Public SaaS median EV/Revenue (Aventis, S&P Capital IQ) | Mar 2020 | 9.6x | Public trading | March 2020 Aventis Advisors, SaaS Valuation Multiples 2015-2026 (S&P Capital IQ data as of 31 Aug 2026) |
| Public SaaS median EV/Revenue (Aventis, S&P Capital IQ) | Dec 2020 | 19.3x | Public trading | December 2020 Aventis Advisors, SaaS Valuation Multiples 2015-2026 (S&P Capital IQ data as of 31 Aug 2026) |
| Public SaaS median EV/Revenue (Aventis, S&P Capital IQ) | Apr 2023 | 6.9x | Public trading | Spring 2023 (Array Capital cites 6.7x for 2023) Aventis Advisors, SaaS Valuation Multiples 2015-2026 (S&P Capital IQ data as of 31 Aug 2026) |
| Public SaaS median EV/Revenue (Aventis, S&P Capital IQ) | Jan 2025 | 7.7x | Public trading | Early 2025 (Array Capital cites 7.3x) Aventis Advisors, SaaS Valuation Multiples 2015-2026 (S&P Capital IQ data as of 31 Aug 2026) |
| Public SaaS median EV/Revenue (Aventis, S&P Capital IQ) | Jul 2025 | 6.0x | Public trading | July 2025 Aventis Advisors, SaaS Valuation Multiples 2015-2026 (S&P Capital IQ data as of 31 Aug 2026) |
| Public SaaS median EV/Revenue (Aventis, S&P Capital IQ) | Mar 2026 | 3.4x | Public trading | March 2026 Array Capital, B2B SaaS valuation multiples 2021 to 2026 (updated 30 Jul 2026) |
| Public SaaS median EV/Revenue (Aventis, S&P Capital IQ) | Aug 2026 | 4.6x | Public trading | August 2026 (as of 31 Aug 2026) Aventis Advisors, SaaS Valuation Multiples 2015-2026 (S&P Capital IQ data as of 31 Aug 2026) |
| Windsor Drake SaaS composite median EV/revenue (34 listed companies) | Aug 21, 2026 | 4.9x | Public trading | Q3 2026 set, 21 Aug 2026 (IQR 3.9x to 7.5x; infrastructure 9.3x, vertical 6.9x, horizontal 4.1x) Windsor Drake, SaaS Valuations: Q3 2026 (34-constituent composite computed 21 August 2026) |
Benchmark version 2026.10.20-1. Sources: Windsor Drake SaaS Valuations Q3 2026 (computed 21 Aug 2026); Clouded Judgment 25 Sep 2026; SEG 2Q26 SaaS report and annual report (3Q26 not yet published); SEG SaaS Index page (Tiingo data); Aventis Advisors (S&P Capital IQ); Array Capital; Multiples.vc 22 Sep 2026.
SaaS M&A median · EV/TTM revenue
4.0x
down from 4.2x the prior quarter
SEG · Q2 2026 · 2,784 TTM deals
Public SaaS median · EV/TTM revenue
3.2x
down from 5.7x in Q2 2025
SEG SaaS Index · Q2 2026 · n=106
SaaS M&A deal volume · TTM
2,784
up 16% year over year
SEG · Q2 2026
Top-quartile disclosed deals
8.1x+
vs. 2.4x at the first quartile
Aventis Advisors · 2015 to 2026 · n=543
Before the Numbers
Most SaaS valuation content quotes a single multiple with no denominator, no period, and no sample. Those figures are not comparable, and averaging them produces noise. Three distinctions do most of the work:
Two more: an index median (what 106 public companies trade at) is not a deal median (what acquirers actually paid), and a disclosed-deal sample skews toward larger, cleaner transactions. Every table on this page is labeled by source, basis, period, and sample size so the datasets are never blended.
A SaaS multiple quoted without a denominator, a period, and a sample size is marketing, not data.
The Market
The 2021 peak, when public SaaS medians reached the high teens on EV/revenue, is two full repricings ago. The 2022 to 2023 correction removed the free-money premium. The 2025 to 2026 move is different in kind: public software is being repriced for AI exposure, and the median public SaaS company now trades at 3.2x TTM revenue, roughly half its level of a year ago.
The number founders should watch is the other one. While the public median halved, the M&A median moved from 4.2x to 4.0x. Acquirers did not step away; they closed 2,784 SaaS transactions over the trailing twelve months, up 16 percent year over year. Buyers are active and price-disciplined at the same time. That combination punishes unprepared sellers and rewards prepared ones, because the spread between an average outcome and a premium outcome is now the widest part of the market.
One year of repricing: public tape vs. deal market
Median EV/TTM revenue, Q2 2025 → Q2 2026 · SEG SaaS Index (n=106) and SEG SaaS M&A dataset
6x 4x 2x 0 Q2 2025 Q2 2026 5.7x 3.2x 4.2x 4.0x Public M&A
SEG · Q2 2026 Software Equity Group quarterly report. Public index n=106 B2B SaaS companies; M&A dataset 2,784 TTM transactions. Basis: EV/TTM revenue.
What remains after the repricing is a disciplined market with wide dispersion. The companies commanding premium multiples grow more slowly than the 2021 cohort but earn real margins, retain revenue at 110 percent or better, and can survive an AI diligence conversation. The spread between premium and average is where the money is, and the rest of this page is about which side of it a business lands on.
Public Markets
Public comps set the ceiling for private conversations, so it matters which public number you anchor to. The figures below come from three independent trackers. They differ because their denominators and samples differ, not because any of them is wrong.
| SEG SaaS Index | EV/TTM revenue | 3.2x | Q2 2026 | 106 public B2B SaaS companies; median revenue $1.2B |
| Windsor Drake composite | EV/revenue | 4.9x | 21 Aug 2026 | 34 listed SaaS companies; IQR 3.9x to 7.5x; data and infrastructure 9.3x, vertical 6.9x, horizontal 4.1x |
| Clouded Judgment | EV/NTM revenue | 4.2x | 25 Sep 2026 | Public cloud software basket; high growth 18.0x, mid growth 6.7x, low growth 3.3x |
| Aventis Advisors | EV/revenue | 4.6x | August 2026 | 70 NASDAQ/NYSE SaaS companies, $1B+ market cap |
| Multiples.vc | EV/NTM revenue | 2.2 to 2.8x | Aug 20, 2026 | Horizontal 2.2x · vertical 2.3x · infrastructure 2.8x; FactSet consensus |
Labeled datasets NTM medians run below TTM medians for growing companies by construction. Quoting a 2.2x NTM figure against a 3.2x TTM figure as a “decline” is a category error; both are shown so the bases are explicit.
Two features of the current tape matter for founders. First, the median hides the dispersion: AI-levered infrastructure and design software carry premium multiples while low-growth application categories trade near 1x revenue. The market is no longer paying for the category; it is paying for the position within it. Second, the median public SaaS company now posts real profitability. SEG’s index shows median EBITDA of $110M, up 70 percent year over year on a TTM basis. Public investors converted the growth-at-any-price cohort into a cash-flow cohort, and buyer diligence in private deals has followed the same path.
For a deeper treatment of how growth and profitability trade off in pricing, see the firm’s Rule of 40 guide and the Rule of 40 Premium report.
Private Market
The private data comes in two layers. The first is measured: what disclosed M&A transactions actually priced at. The second is advisory: where founder-led companies of a given ARR scale realistically clear, based on Windsor Drake’s sell-side processes and the disclosed record. The two are labeled separately and should not be blended.
| SEG | EV/TTM revenue | 4.0x | Q2 2026 | Disclosed-multiple deals within 2,784 TTM transactions |
| Windsor Drake | EV/revenue | 2.9x | 2026 to August | Nine realized software control transactions; three at 9.4x to 11.5x (Clearwater 11.5x, Confluent 9.4x), five at 1.2x to 2.9x, Simulations Plus 4.7x between |
| Aventis Advisors | EV/revenue | 4.5x | 2015 to 2026 | 543 disclosed deals · IQR 2.4x to 8.1x · median deal $80M |
| Aventis Advisors | EV/revenue | 3.1x | As of March 2026 | Trailing subset of the same series; recent quarters price tighter |
| Aventis Advisors | EV/EBITDA | 23.0x | 2015 to 2026 | 232 disclosed deals; skews to larger, profitable targets |
Disclosure bias Disclosed multiples over-represent larger, cleaner deals. The unreported long tail of small transactions prices lower. Read these medians as the visible market, not the whole market.
Size is the strongest structural driver in the disclosed record. Aventis finds targets with $50 to 100M of revenue commanding roughly twice the multiple of $20 to 50M targets, with $500M+ transactions reaching a 6.2x median. Scale de-risks the asset, widens the buyer universe, and adds competing bidders, and each of those effects compounds the others.
| $1M to $3M | 2.5 to 4.0x | 5x+ | SDE and ARR hybrid | Individual buyers, holdcos, micro-PE |
| $3M to $10M | 3.0 to 5.0x | 6x+ | ARR multiple, EBITDA-checked | PE platforms, first strategics |
| $10M to $25M | 4.0 to 6.5x | 8x+ | ARR multiple | PE platforms, strategic acquirers |
| $25M+ | 5.0 to 8.0x | 10x+ | ARR multiple, growth-adjusted | Strategics, sponsor-backed consolidators |
Windsor Drake estimate Advisory ranges for founder-led B2B SaaS, August 2026. Directional estimates drawn from the firm’s sell-side processes and the disclosed record above, not a statistical sample. Premium cases assume Rule of 40 cleared, NRR above 115 percent, and a competitive process. Cross-checks: SEG deal median 4.0x (Q2 2026); Aventis 4.5x (2015 to 2026, n=543).
Within any band, the multiple is set by the quality profile, not the ARR figure. A $6M ARR business at 120 percent NRR with clean cohort data will out-price a $12M ARR business bleeding logos. The band determines who shows up to the process; the metrics determine what they pay. The drivers section below quantifies which metrics move the number most.
Framework
No serious buyer runs one method. Expect the ARR multiple to lead the conversation, EBITDA or SDE to discipline it, a DCF to sanity-check it, and comparable transactions to anchor the final number. Sophisticated sellers prepare all five before the first buyer conversation, because whichever method the seller has not prepared is the one the buyer will lead with.
| ARR revenue multiple | 3 to 5x typical 5 to 8x+ premium | Growth-stage businesses where current profitability understates forward value. The dominant method in SaaS M&A. |
| EBITDA multiple | 10 to 18x founder-led LMM | Mature, profitable companies; PE underwriting debt service. Disclosed M&A median is 23.0x (Aventis, n=232) but that sample skews to larger targets. See the adjusted EBITDA guide. |
| Seller discretionary earnings | 3 to 5x SDE | Founder-operated companies below roughly $5M ARR, where owner compensation and discretionary spend blur EBITDA. |
| Discounted cash flow | 12 to 18% discount rate | Predictable revenue bases. Used as a sanity check on multiple-based answers, rarely as the headline. |
| Comparable transactions | 4.0 to 4.5x medians 8.1x+ top quartile | Anchoring to actual clearing prices: SEG median 4.0x (Q2 2026), Aventis 4.5x median and 8.1x third quartile (2015 to 2026). |
Windsor Drake ranges August 2026, founder-led lower middle market. Comparable-transaction anchors as labeled. SEG Aventis
The methods disagree by design. A business at $8M ARR growing 35 percent with breakeven economics might support 5x ARR on the revenue method and almost nothing on EBITDA. The negotiation is over which method governs, and that is a positioning argument, not an arithmetic one. Winning it is most of the reason to run a structured sell-side process rather than respond to a single inbound.
Premium Drivers
Four factors explain most of the spread between a 3-handle and a 7-handle on ARR. Buyers price all four; sellers usually prepare one.
Revenue growth rate plus EBITDA margin, with 40 as the threshold. It has become the strongest single predictor of SaaS multiples because it prices balance: growth a buyer does not have to subsidize. A company growing 30 percent at a 10 percent margin clears it; so does one growing 15 percent at a 25 percent margin. In Windsor Drake processes, businesses clearing 40 consistently price one to two turns of ARR above otherwise comparable peers, and businesses above 50 with strong retention set the top of the range. The firm’s Rule of 40 Premium report quantifies the spread across software, fintech, AI, and cybersecurity, including why two companies with identical scores can trade multiples apart.
NRR is the cleanest read on product value because it measures what existing customers do with their wallets. Below roughly 95 percent, buyers cap the multiple regardless of growth; new sales are refilling a leaking bucket. From 100 to 110 percent, the business prices with the market. Above 115 percent, expansion revenue compounds at near-zero acquisition cost and buyers underwrite it as durable. The relationship is nonlinear: in our processes, the spread between sub-95 and 120-plus NRR is routinely two to three turns of ARR. Demonstrating it requires clean cohort data across three to five years, which is why cohort preparation appears in the exit-readiness work, not the final quarter.
Pure SaaS gross margins of 75 to 85 percent are what justify revenue-multiple pricing at all. Subscription revenue above 80 percent of total is the working threshold for pure-play classification. Below roughly 70 percent gross margin, or with a heavy services mix, buyers quietly shift from the ARR framework to EBITDA, and the headline multiple conversation changes shape. Revenue quality review comes before any process: contract terms, billing structure, logo concentration, and the split between subscription, usage, and services.
The public tape currently prices vertical and horizontal SaaS almost identically: 2.3x versus 2.2x median EV/NTM revenue as of August 2026. The private premium is real but it is earned, not categorical. Vertical leaders with dominant share of a defined niche, structurally low churn, and embedded payments or fintech attach price meaningfully above horizontal peers of the same size, because acquirers are buying a moat they cannot build sideways. The premium is not for being vertical; it is for owning a vertical. See the Vertical SaaS Valuation Report for sub-sector detail.
Buyer Dynamics
The same company prices differently depending on who is across the table, because each buyer class is solving a different problem.
Strategic acquirers buy capability: market entry, roadmap acceleration, customer access, competitive defense. When an asset closes a specific strategic gap, the ceiling is set by the cost of not owning it, which is why strategics set the top of the range in well-run processes. The premium is buyer-specific and does not survive a one-buyer negotiation; it has to be surfaced against an alternative.
Private equity buys durability and arbitrage. A platform acquisition of a profitable, stable SaaS business typically prices at 4 to 6x revenue in our observed range, underwritten to debt capacity and exit multiple. Add-on acquisitions price below platforms, often 3 to 5x, because the sponsor is paying for revenue it can consolidate, not a new thesis. Founders fielding an add-on offer should understand which side of that line they are on before anchoring. The firm’s guides on who buys SaaS companies and selling to private equity cover the mechanics; sell-side representation itself runs through the firm’s B2B SaaS M&A advisory practice.
The arithmetic of getting this right is not subtle. On a $10M ARR business, the difference between a 4x add-on outcome and a 7x strategic outcome is $30 million, on the same company, in the same quarter. Buyer selection and sequencing, not the asset, produce that spread.
Interactive
Directional output from the advisory ranges and premium drivers on this page. Five inputs, no email gate, nothing stored.
Current ARR run-rate
Year-over-year ARR growth
Adjusted EBITDA as a share of revenue; negatives allowed
Revenue retained plus expansion from existing customers
Blended, after hosting and support costs
Indicated enterprise value
$27M to $38M
3.4x to 4.8x ARR · base case 4.0x
Rule of 40 score35
ARR band$3M to $10M
ReadSolid, below premium threshold
Directional estimate from Windsor Drake advisory heuristics, August 2026. Not a valuation, a fairness opinion, or an offer. Actual outcomes are set by revenue quality, cohort data, buyer fit, and process competition.
Request a confidential valuation
Preparation
The premium cases in the ARR table are not lucky. Across the firm’s processes, the same four preparations separate them from the median, and none of them can be manufactured in the quarter before a sale.
GAAP-aligned revenue recognition, a clean ARR bridge, and cohort tables that survive a quality-of-earnings review. Buyers discount what they cannot verify, and they verify everything. A diligence-ready data room routinely saves half a turn of ARR that would otherwise be conceded in re-trading.
Uniform terms, auto-renewal, annual prepay where the market allows, and assignment clauses that do not require customer consent at change of control. Non-standard paper is invisible until diligence, and then it prices.
A business that runs without its founder transfers value; a business that is its founder transfers risk. Key-person discount shows up in both price and structure, usually as extended earnouts. Building a second layer of leadership 18 to 24 months before a process converts structure into cash at close. This is the core of exit readiness.
The multiple is a negotiated outcome, not a measurement. Competitive tension among the right buyers, sequenced deliberately, is the single largest controllable driver of the final number. One inbound offer is a price; a designed process is a market. The gap between them is the spread this page keeps quantifying.
Outlook
Volume up, pricing disciplined. Deal count rose 16 percent over the trailing twelve months while the M&A median eased from 4.2x to 4.0x. Buyers have capital and mandates but no urgency to overpay. Expect processes to take longer in diligence and for quality assets to attract disproportionate attention precisely because the median asset is uninspiring.
The AI bifurcation hardens. Windsor Drake’s research desk measured AI companies commanding roughly 24x revenue against roughly 5x for SaaS across 2025 deal activity. In 2026 the question buyers ask of every SaaS target is which side of the line it sits on: credible, revenue-bearing AI capability prices at the top of the range, while exposure to AI substitution is priced as decay. Sellers should arrive with an evidence-backed answer before a buyer supplies one.
Retention replaces growth as the first diligence question. With the median public company profitable and growth scarcer, NRR and gross-revenue retention carry more pricing weight than headline growth. Cohort data is now first-meeting material.
For sellers, the window favors preparation. A disciplined market punishes improvisation but pays for scarcity. Founder-led businesses clearing the Rule of 40 with 110-plus NRR are scarce, and scarce assets in active markets are exactly where competitive processes outperform. Founders weighing timing can start with whether to sell and the full SaaS M&A guide.
Provenance
Every figure on this page carries one of two labels. Source figures are reproduced from named datasets with their period, basis, and sample size stated inline. Windsor Drake estimate figures are advisory ranges from the firm’s sell-side processes, labeled as estimates and never presented as measured data. The two are not blended, averaged, or restated.
This page is refreshed quarterly and updated in place. Figures are replaced, not layered, so nothing on this page reflects a prior period unless labeled as history.
Common Questions
Page History
About the Author
Jeff Barrington is Founder & Managing Director of Windsor Drake, a sell-side M&A advisory firm for founder-led software, fintech, and technology companies with offices in New York and Toronto. An operator who built and sold his own business before founding the firm, he has advised on more than $750 million in technology transaction value since 2018, accepts fewer than twenty mandates a year, and leads each personally.
Windsor Drake’s research program, including this benchmark, the Fintech Exit Index, and the firm’s quarterly reports, is the same analytical infrastructure applied in live engagements.
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The firm’s disclosed-transaction fintech benchmark.
Who We Represent
Founder-led software, fintech, and payments companies with enterprise values between $5 million and $300 million, evaluating a full or partial sale, generational transition, or institutional recapitalization.
FAQ
The median SaaS M&A transaction priced at 4.0x EV/TTM revenue in Q2 2026, and the median public SaaS company traded at 3.2x EV/TTM revenue across the 106-company SEG Index. Founder-led lower middle market SaaS typically clears between 3x and 6.5x ARR, with top-quartile disclosed deals above 8x.
Five methods, usually applied together: the ARR revenue multiple (3 to 5x typical, 5 to 8x and above for premium businesses), the EBITDA multiple (10 to 18x for founder-led lower middle market companies), seller discretionary earnings for founder-operated companies below $5M ARR (3 to 5x), discounted cash flow at a 12 to 18 percent discount rate as a sanity check, and comparable transaction analysis anchored to current medians of 4.0 to 4.5x revenue.
Primarily with revenue multiples applied to ARR, reflecting growth, net revenue retention, gross margin, and market position. Profitable, mature SaaS companies are also valued on EBITDA multiples. Buyers cross-check both against comparable transactions and a DCF, and the negotiation is usually over which method governs.
The Rule of 40 states that revenue growth rate plus EBITDA margin should equal or exceed 40 percent. A company growing 30 percent with a 10 percent margin meets it; so does one growing 15 percent with a 25 percent margin. It is the strongest single predictor of SaaS multiples, and businesses clearing it consistently price one to two turns of ARR above otherwise comparable peers.
An individual private company prices below an identical public peer for four reasons: liquidity risk, scale risk, information risk, and control risk. Note the aggregate wrinkle in 2026: the disclosed M&A median (4.0x) sits above the public index median (3.2x), because disclosed private deals skew toward quality assets and include control premiums, while the public median is weighed down by low-growth incumbents. The discount is real asset-by-asset even when the aggregate medians appear inverted.
In public markets the gap is currently thin: 2.3x versus 2.2x median EV/NTM revenue as of August 2026. In private M&A the premium is real but earned: vertical leaders with dominant category share, structurally low churn, and embedded payments price meaningfully above horizontal peers of the same size. The premium is not for being vertical; it is for owning a vertical.
Net revenue retention is the cleanest read on product value. Below roughly 95 percent, buyers cap the multiple regardless of growth. From 100 to 110 percent, the business prices with the market. Above 115 percent, expansion revenue compounds at near-zero acquisition cost and buyers underwrite it as durable. In Windsor Drake processes, the spread between sub-95 and 120-plus NRR is routinely two to three turns of ARR, and demonstrating it requires clean cohort data across three to five years.
When the business can demonstrate a Rule of 40 score at or above 40, NRR above 110 percent, clean diligence-ready financials, and a management team that operates independently of the founder. Market conditions matter less than preparation, but 2026’s combination of rising deal volume and disciplined pricing favors well-prepared assets in competitive processes.
The impact is bifurcated. Windsor Drake’s research desk measured AI companies commanding roughly 24x revenue against roughly 5x for SaaS in 2025 deal activity, a premium of about four times across verticals. Traditional SaaS with credible, revenue-bearing AI capability prices at the top of its range; SaaS perceived as AI-disruptable is being repriced downward, and buyers now run that assessment in the first diligence pass.
On Windsor Drake’s August 2026 advisory ranges for founder-led B2B SaaS, companies with $1M to $3M of ARR typically price at 2.5x to 4.0x ARR, $3M to $10M at 3.0x to 5.0x, $10M to $25M at 4.0x to 6.5x and $25M+ at 5.0x to 8.0x. Premium cases price above those bands, usually with the Rule of 40 cleared, net revenue retention above 115 percent and a competitive process.
Founder-led lower middle market SaaS companies valued on earnings typically price at 10x to 18x EBITDA on Windsor Drake’s August 2026 ranges. The disclosed M&A median is higher, 23.0x across 232 deals from 2015 to 2026 per Aventis Advisors, because that sample skews to larger, profitable targets. Buyers tend to move from the ARR framework to EBITDA once gross margin falls below roughly 70 percent or services make up a large share of revenue.
The answer depends on the basis. The SEG SaaS Index median was 3.2x EV/TTM revenue at the end of Q2 2026. Aventis Advisors put the public median at 4.6x EV/revenue in August 2026, Clouded Judgment’s cloud software basket ended Q3 2026 at 4.2x EV/NTM revenue, and the SaaS Capital Index stood at 4.2x current run-rate revenue on 30 September 2026. NTM figures run below TTM figures for growing companies.
EV/TTM revenue divides enterprise value by the last twelve months of revenue and is the standard for M&A comps. EV/NTM revenue uses analyst consensus for the next twelve months, so it is always lower than TTM for a growing company. EV/ARR uses the current annual recurring revenue run-rate and is the working currency of private SaaS deals. A 2.2x NTM figure set against a 3.2x TTM figure is not a decline.
A founder-led business with about $10M of ARR sits where two of Windsor Drake’s advisory bands meet: 3.0x to 5.0x ARR below $10M and 4.0x to 6.5x from $10M to $25M, or roughly $30 million to $65 million of enterprise value. Buyer type moves the result. On the same $10M ARR company, a 4x add-on outcome and a 7x strategic outcome differ by $30 million.
Windsor Drake advises founder-led companies on sell-side M&A. A first conversation is confidential and starts with your numbers.
Research, not investment advice, a fairness opinion or a valuation of any specific company. Third-party data is cited to its source and remains its owner’s. Windsor Drake is not a registered broker-dealer and does not offer, sell or place securities. When a transaction requires a registered broker-dealer, that work is handled by a registered broker-dealer partner.